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Abstract
Due to the recent outbreak of COVID-19, many gov-
ernments suspended outdoor activities and imposed
social distancing policies to prevent the transmission
of SARS-CoV-2. These measures have had severe
impact on the economy and peoples’ daily lives. An
alternative to widespread lockdowns is effective con-
tact tracing during an outbreak’s early stage. How-
ever, mathematical models (e.g., [24]) suggest that
epidemic control for SARS-CoV-2 transmission with
manual contact tracing is implausible. To reduce
the effort of contact tracing, many digital contact
tracing projects (e.g., PEPP-PT [7], DP-3T [34],
TCN [8], BlueTrace [13], Google/Apple Exposure No-
tification [4], and East/West Coast PACT [6, 17])
are being developed to supplement manual con-
tact tracing. However, digital contact tracing has
drawn scrutiny from privacy advocates, since gov-
ernments or other parties may attempt to use con-
tact tracing protocols for mass surveillance. As a
result, many digital contact tracing projects build
privacy-preserving mechanisms to limit the amount
of privacy-sensitive information leaked by the pro-
tocol. In this paper, we examine how these archi-
tectures resist certain classes of attacks, specifically
DoS attacks, and present BlindSignedIDs, a privacy-
preserving digital contact tracing mechanism, which
are verifiable ephemeral identifiers to limit the effec-
tiveness of MAC-compliant DoS attacks. In our
evaluations, we showed BlindSignedID can effectively
deny bogus EphIDs, mitigating DoS attacks on the
local storage beyond 90% of stored EphIDs. Our ex-
ample DoS attacks showed that using 4 attackers
can cause the gigabyte level DoS attacks within nor-
mal working hours and days.
Keywords: Denial-of-Service Attacks, Privacy, Digi-
tal Contact Tracing, COVID-19
1 Introduction
In light of the success of several countries’ SARS-CoV-2
containment strategies based on aggressive contact trac-
ing, several researchers have developed approaches to dig-
ital contact tracing [4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, 34]. Because of the
privacy concerns inherent with disclosing user location
traces, several proposals include mechanisms for privacy-
preserving proximity tracing. These mecachisms make
use of a limited-time identity to reduce an adversary’s
ability to track that device from broadcast to broadcast;
these identities are variously called ephemeral ID [34],
Temporary ID [13], and Rolling Proximity ID [4]; in this
paper, we will use the term ephemeral ID or EphID . To re-
duce the amount of bandwidth needed to disseminate pos-
itive identities, these ephemeral IDs are generated from
a master secret in a one-way manner, such that the mas-
ter secret is sufficient to derive all relevant ephemeral IDs,
but that several ephemeral IDs leak no information about
other associated ephemeral IDs.
In existing designs, a user receiving an ephemeral
ID can neither associate that ephemeral ID with other
ephemeral IDs from the same contact, nor can the user
verify the validity of an ephemeral ID that it receives;
as a result, a user must store all of the ephemeral IDs
that it encounters across the maximum incubation period
(widely set at 14 days for SARS-CoV-2). Furthermore,
storing these ephemeral IDs in the cloud faces significant
privacy challenges; if a large fraction of users trust a sin-
gle cloud storage provider to store unencrypted ephemeral
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IDs, that cloud storage provider would learn extensive
privacy-compromising information about a user’s social
structure. As a result, existing schemes [4, 6, 8, 17, 34]
largely assume that ephemeral IDs are stored on the
user’s own device until the incubation period has ex-
pired. However, because of the limited storage available
on commonly-used mobile devices, an attacker can send a
large number of bogus ephemeral IDs, overwhelming the
storage of all but high-end devices. We call this attack
the DoS attacks. In fact, the existing EphID-based de-
signs [4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, 34] are widely adapted by many
countries [3, 5, 7, 10, 13], which occupy approximately
12.5% [37] of the world population, thus making these
people’s mobile devices vulnerable to DoS attacks. In
this paper, we propose a design for BlindSignedIDs, where
receivers can verify ephemeral IDs in-place, and senders
can generate only a limited number of ephemeral IDs
based on a resource constraint, such as personal phone
numbers, that must be verified before privacy-preserving
verifiable ephemeral identifiers are issued, while still pro-
viding privacy from the certificate authority through the
use of blind signatures. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows: in Section 2, we make system assumptions and
describe the attacker model. In Section 3, we describe the
security issues regarding current designs of digital contact
tracing. Section 4 introduces our approach in detail. We
provide an analysis of BlindSignedID in Section 5 and 6.
Section 7 demonstrates our example DoS attacks and
BlindSignedID can effectively reduce DoS attacks. Sec-
tion 8 reviews current projects. We make conclusions in
Section 9.
2 System Assumptions and
Threat Model
2.1 System Assumptions
Each received EphID is kept in the user’s local storage for
at least 14 days. The stored EphID includes additional in-
formation (e.g., encountering time and duration), which
consumes fixed-byte spaces in the local storage. More-
over, the user stores every received EphID regardless of
any encountering duration for recording and checking ex-
posure. Finally, the mobile devices support Bluetooth
Random Private Address [1], where each received EphID
cannot be linked to the real Bluetooth device address.
2.2 Threat Model
The attacker is able to modify the BLE protocol such
that her device can advertise BLE beacon packets with
the minimum interval. Namely, the transmission interval
is not bounded by the underlaying BLE stack (e.g., max-
imum and minimum intervals in BlueZ [2]). She specifies
the standard BLE flags with arbitrary content (i.e., spoof-
ing EphID) such that other users will receive and keep the
packets in the local storage. Morever, the attacker uses a
powerful BLE antenna for larger transmission ranges.
3 Problem Environment and
Statement
3.1 Existing Contact Tracing Design
In this section, we describe DP-3T [34] at a high level,
to set the context for our attacks and our approaches.
DP-3T generates ephemeral IDs using:
EphID1 || . . . || EphIDn =
PRG (PRF (SKt, ”broadcast key”))
(1)
where EphIDi is a 16-byte ephemeral ID, SKt is secret day
seed, PRF is a pseudo-random function, and PRG is a
pseudo-random generator. To further reduce the amount
of information disseminated for a positive report, DP-3T
generates the next secret day seed SKt by hashing the pre-
vious secret day seed SKt−1 with a one-way hash function,
so that the dissemination of one secret day seed allows
contact tracing for all subsequent days.
Each user generates 288 EphIDs per day, randomly re-
orders them, and uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to
broadcast each EphID for one epoch (5 minutes). A de-
vice receiving such a beacon stores the EphID , signal
strength information (such as RSSI), and the date on
which the beacon was received, for a total of 36 bytes per
EphID for the low-cost design and 52 bytes for the un-
linkable design [34]. A receiving device must store these
records for 14 days. When a user tests positive, her secret
day seeds from the infectious period will be uploaded to
the backend, so that other users can fetch seeds and com-
pare with their local records to determine whether they
have been in contact with this particular user.
3.2 Problem Statement
Although storing in local space with user-generated
ephemeral IDs reveals no information from the user, it
suffers from DoS attacks. Specifically, because a user
cannot link messages from different secret-day seeds (and
even if they could, the attacker can choose arbitrary
secret-day seeds), an attacker with a high-power Blue-
tooth antenna can stream newly-generated ephemeral IDs
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limited only by bandwidth. BLE has bandwidth of 1–
2 Mbps, so any receiver within transmission range of
an attacker will need to store (based on the overhead
specified in the DP-3T paper) 1–2 GB per hour or 8–
16 GB for an 8-hour day. Even when considering the
possibility of compression or elimination of certain data,
the incompressible EphID alone will amount to between
450 MB and 900 MB per hour, or 3.6 GB to 7.2 GB
across an 8-hour working day. Since many phones do not
have several gigabytes of available storage, such an at-
tacker can cause the victims phone to run out of space.
We believe that the lack of authentication of ephemeral
IDs makes many privacy-preserving contact tracing ap-
proaches [4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, 34] vulnerable to DoS at-
tacks.
3.3 Out-of-Scope Problems
Our approaches are designed for the attacks listed above,
and not for other, similar attacks. In this section, we de-
scribe similar attacks that we do not attempt to address,
and discuss the design choices that led us to draw these
boundaries.
Our DoS attacks aims at MAC-and-PHY-compliant
attackers. While previous work has examined jamming
attacks against the physical layer [22, 23, 27, 33] and other
attacks against the MAC layer [11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 25, 28],
the aim of digital contact tracing is to be immediately
available on commodity hardware, which includes com-
modity wireless chipsets. As a result, mechanisms that
require new approaches to the physical-layer or MAC-
layer are non-starters for these protocols. Furthermore,
the level of complexity required to build jamming devices
or MAC-layer attacks makes these attacks less practical
than ones that can be built on any Bluetooth compat-
ible system. When future devices may include support
for more robust physical- and MAC-layers, our work can
integrate with these approaches for greater robustness.
4 Proposed Approach
In this section, we describe our approach to the attacks
discussed earlier. First, we examine how ephemeral IDs
can be verified. Previous work [12, 26, 29, 30, 36] have de-
veloped schemes that use attacker’s resource limitations
(e.g., ability to compute computational puzzles or solve
CAPTCHAs) to create fairness between normal users and
automated attackers. Our approach to BlindSignedIDs
builds on this work to limit the ability of adversaries to
create unbounded numbers of valid ephemeral IDs. In
particular, verifying a user’s real identity or phone num-
ber can serve as the basis for generating a set of valid
identifiers in a privacy-preserving way.
4.1 Generating verifiable ephemeral
identifiers
BlindSignedIDs. We build verifiable ephemeral identifiers
on subliminal-free blind signatures [21], illustrating the
approach using RSA blind signatures. The signer first
generates a public-private key pair for each day; we call
(et, dt) the verification and signing exponent used on day
t − 2 to create credentials for day t. (The modulus n
should also change from day to day.) Both the verification
exponent, the modulus, and a Prefixt (used to pad the
EphID to a length suitable for signing) are published in
advance of day t−2. On day t−2, the user creates a main
secret day seed skt, and uses a pseudo-random generator
on skt to generate M secondary secret day seeds:
SKt1 || . . . || SKtM = PRG (PRF (skt)) (2)
(where M is chosen to reduce the chance that an attacker
generates EphIDs corresponding to a secret key; we sug-
gest M = 100) and generates M sets of EphIDs using
{EphID1 || . . . || EphIDn}M =
PRG (PRF (SKtM , ”broadcast key M”))
(3)
The user then blinds each EphID . To blind EphIDs in
a manner easily verifiable by the signer, the user chooses
a main blinding seed bt and uses a pseudo-random gen-
erator on bt to generate M secondary blinding seeds bti ,
one for each secondary secret day seed:
bt1 || . . . || btM = PRG (PRF (bt)) (4)
The user then uses a pseudo-random generator on each
bti to compute a set of blinding values for each EphID ,
with
{rˆ1 || . . . || rˆn}i = PRG (PRF (bti))
rij = rˆij
et
(5)
where et is the signer’s public exponent, and blinding the
EphID
EphID′ij := ( Prefixt || EphIDij ) ∗ rij (6)
Prefixt is a value chosen for that day to pad the EphID to
the size of the RSA group. For example, if we use 2048-bit
RSA and 104-bit EphID , the Prefixt is 1944 bits. In this
manner, the user generates M sets of n blinded EphIDs,
each of which corresponds to a single secondary secret day
seed. The user then contacts the backend server, proves
3
Figure 1: User Registration.
her identity (for example, a phone number, social media
account, or national identity), and sends the set of all Mn
blinded EphIDs to the signer. The signer first verifies
the identity and ensures that it has not previously signed
certificates for this identity for this day. The signer then
chooses one set of blinded EphIDs asks the user to reveal
the blinding factors and secondary secret day seeds of all
remaining sets. The user then reveals the requested secret
day seeds and their corresponding blinding seeds. If all
revealed EphIDs generated correctly, the signer blindly
signs all resulting values from the selected set and sends
the signed values back to the user, as shown in Equation 7.
SD′is := EphID
′dt
is
(7)
where dt is the private key for signing on day t− 2 (and
use on day t). If EphIDs are not correctly generated, the
signer adds the user into a blocklist, such that the cre-
dentials she used are not valid at the signer for a certain
period of time (the length of time to be chosen should
depend on the possibility of reassignment; for example,
longer-term blocking for national identities and social me-
dia accounts may be reasonable, but blocks for phone
numbers should expire after a few months). By ensuring
that EphIDs are generated correctly, we can ensure that
a positive test can be represented by a single secondary
secret-day seed, ensuring that anyone broadcasting verifi-
able ephemeral identifiers can correctly report a positive
test. Figure 1 illustrates the registration process.
The user computes signatures SDi from the signed val-
ues SD′ij by inverting the rˆij used to blind each EphIDis :
SDis := SD
′dt
i ∗ rˆ−1is mod N
= (( Prefixt || EphIDis) ∗ ris)dt ∗ rˆis−1 mod N
= ( Prefixt || EphIDis)dt ∗ rˆiset∗dt ∗ rˆis−1 mod N
= ( Prefixt || EphIDis)dt ∗ rˆis ∗ rˆis−1 mod N
= ( Prefixt || EphIDis)dt mod N
(8)
All EphIDs generated and signed on day t − 2 are used
on day t. We can choose an arbitrary period for signing
and refreshing keys, but we choose a day in line with
DP-3T [34].
4.2 Authenticating verifiable
ephemeral identifiers in Bea-
cons
Because BLE beacons only have 31 bytes of space, of
which 3 bytes are used for BLE flags, including a blind
signature for an EphID into the beacon would require
the use of several beacons, which could lead to compu-
tational attacks on packet defragmentation. To avoid
these possibilities, we propose to have the signer ex-
change signed EphIDs for EphIDs authenticated using
TESLA [31]. TESLA uses authenticators based on sym-
metric cryptography to provide broadcast authentication
by using the time at which information is disclosed as
the mechanism for creating asymmetry. In particular,
the entity wishing to authenticate messages (in this case,
the signer) creates a sequence of keys using a one-way
hash function: k1, k2 = H(k1), . . . , ki+1 = H(ki) . . .,
and a schedule at which these keys will be released:
t1, t2 = t1 + T, . . . , ti+1 = ti + T . . ., as illustrated in
Figure 2. The signer will release key ki at time ti, so
if a verifier receives a message before the signer’s clock
has reached ti, the signer knows that the message is au-
thentic if it is authenticated using the key ki. TESLA
relies on loose time-synchronization for security, mean-
ing that each clock must be within a bounded margin
of error ∆ from the signer’s clock (in our design, T will
be approximately 5 minutes, and the maximum time-
synchronization error will be around 10 seconds). Thus,
if the message is received before time ti − ∆ on the re-
ceiver’s clock, the receiver knows that it is before time ti
on the signer’s clock.
To exchange RSA blind-signed verifiable ephemeral
identifiers for TESLA-authenticated MACs correspond-
ing to each EphID , a user requests them through a
MIX [20] on day t− 1, providing a nonce, an encryption
4
Figure 2: Key Sequence.
BLE Flags
(3 bytes)
BlindSignedID (28 bytes)
Len (1 byte) EphID (13 bytes) Auth (13 bytes)Type (1 byte)
Figure 3: BLE Beacon Format.
key, the EphID , the corresponding signature SD , and the
time interval at which the user intends to use them on
day t (these time intervals should be standardized across
all requesters to minimize privacy loss). The signer veri-
fies the signature, and if valid and not requested before,
generates the authenticator (Auth) for the requested time
interval. The signer then encrypts the authenticator using
the encryption key and publishes the nonce and encrypted
authenticator. On day t − 1, a user can retrieve their
authenticators for day t using one of three approaches:
(i) full download: the user downloads the entire list of
nonces and encrypted authenticators, discarding all val-
ues other than the ones chosen by the user; (ii) partial
download: the user intially constructs the nonces so that
they are equal in some bits; the user then requests a sub-
set of the list by specifying the bits that are equal across
all of that users’ requests; (iii) individual download: a
user with limited resources can also request their authen-
ticators through anonymous connection such as Tor [9].
Because authenticators for each EphID are requested sep-
arately through a MIX, the signer cannot link two EphIDs
except to know that EphIDs authenticated for the same
time are likely to be from different users.
When broadcasting a beacon, a user broadcasts the
EphID and the TESLA authenticator used for the cur-
rent time interval. When receiving a beacon, a receiver
carries the EphID , the Auth, the time of receipt, and
the signal strength. A beacon is kept for two time inter-
vals; if the two keys following the time of receipt do not
match the Auth, then the receiver knows that the EphID
is not authenticated for the interval in which it was used
(see evaluations in Section 7.1). Finally, we use 13 bytes
(104 bits) for both EphIDs and Auth to fit within the
28-byte payload limit, as shown in Figure 3.
4.3 Storing Received Beacons
When a device receives a beacon, the user stores them as
(EphIDi,Authi, time,RSSI). When the user obtains the
current released key ki at time ti from TESLA server, she
firstly verifies ki with ki−1 by a one-way hash function;
she then verifies each EphIDs received in the previous pe-
riod by checking its authenticator Authi. If the Authi is
valid, the device accepts the record and keeps that record
in longer-term storage; authenticator verification can be
performed in-place to mitigate DoS attacks. Option-
ally, our protocol can be combined with [32] to prevent
relay and replay attacks. However, the details of prevent-
ing relay and replay attacks are beyond the scope of our
protocol.
4.4 Checking Exposure
When a health authority determines a user is a positive
case, all her secondary secret-day seeds and the selected
numbers s during the infectious period (typically 2 days
before symptoms happen) are published in a blockchain,
together with a sequential case number for the day of
publication. Each user fetches the list of these positive
cases, and generates EphIDs with the secondary secret-
day seeds and the selected numbers s, and compares the
EphIDs with the EphIDs in their local storage. If there
is a match, the device can suspect contact with a positive
case.
FinalTrial. We propose to use the blockchain to pro-
vide an additional defense to the identifier-spoofing
attacks. When a user generates BlindSignedIDs, she also
requests blind-signatures for a set of codes of the form
i || ni, where ni is a nonce and i represents a sequential
case number; these codes are signed with a daily signing
key different than the signing key used for BlindSignedIDs.
Specifically, the user generates sufficient codes to respond
to the maximum number of positive tests that might rea-
sonable affect her jurisdiction for a day. Each such test
is a nonce ni. She then builds a Merkle tree over these
nonces, by first hashing each one, then hashing adjacent
pairs to reach a tree root. She blinds the tree root R
by calculating Rreti , has it signed as s = (Rr
et
i )
dt , and
unblinds the signature by calculating SP = r−1i si = R
dt .
When a device matches positive case number i, instead
of immediately notifying the user, the device posts ni,
SP, and the Merkle path required for verification to the
blockchain, allowing each user to determine the number
of matches corresponding to each positive case. When
a single positive case experiences an excessive number of
matches, the device may choose to warn the user that the
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match seems unlikely, or may entirely ignore the match.
5 Privacy Analysis
In our design, real IDs (such as phone numbers) are
revealed to a signing server before the server pro-
vides EphIDs. Since EphIDs are blind-signed with a
subliminal-channel-free signature, each EphID is indistin-
guishable, and could be associated with any real ID that
was presented on the day on which it was signed.
Lemma 1. Given two signed EphIDs, EphID1 and
EphID2, and two possible identities, A and B, the signer
can gain no advantage on which EphID is assigned to
which identity; that is, any attempt to assign EphIDi to
A succeeds with probability 1/2.
Proof. The signer generates a RSA key pair (e, d) and a
public modulo N , and publishes the public exponent and
modulo (e, N). The user generates a set of ephemeral
identifiers, {EphID1, . . . , EphIDn}, and a set of random
numbers raised by the public exponent e modulo N to
create blinding factors, {re1 mod N, . . . , ren mod N}. She
multiplies the ephemeral identifiers with the blinding fac-
tors to obtain the resulting value set R.
R := {EphID1 ∗ re1 mod N, . . . ,EphIDn ∗ ren mod N} (9)
The set R is sent to the signer, and the signer signs each
EphID inR using the private key d. Since redi = rimod N,
the signer generates a signature set SD
SD := {EphIDd1 ∗r1mod N, ...,EphIDdn ∗rnmod N} (10)
The signer learns the signature set SD is associated with
the user’s real IDs. However, for any pair of values (x, y)
in the signature set SD
(EphIDdx ∗ rx mod N,EphIDdy ∗ ry mod N)← SD (11)
Since the blinding factors are randomly generated, they
could take on any value. For example, if we consider
two EphIDs, EphID1 and EphID2, blinded as follows:
(EphID1∗re1,EphID2∗re2), these are indistinguishable from
(EphID2 ∗ (EphID1 ∗ EphID−12 ∗ re1), (EphID1 ∗ (EphID2 ∗
EphID−11 ∗ re1)). In other words, for each EphID EphIDi
and each blinded EphID EphIDjr
e
j , there exists a blind-
ing factor for EphIDi such that the signing request for
EphIDj would create a signature for EphIDi. Naturally,
the security of the blind-signature scheme requires that
such blinding factors be computationally difficult to com-
pute, but they exist and are equiprobable blinding fac-
tors: specifically, if a signer generates N signatures on
one day, then for any given EphID , there are N blind-
ing possible blinding factors, each of which corresponds
to one blind-signature request. Each such blinding factor
is indistinguishably probable to the signer.
When a user provides authenticators to the signer, she
also includes the time interval and a nonce; the signer
therefore learns only the which EphIDs are used in each
time interval, and the correlation between nonces and
EphIDs. First, if the signer is not compromised, there is
no privacy loss, because only the signer has the correlation
between EphID and nonce. Even when the signer is com-
promised, a user adopting the full download method re-
veals no information about her authenticators. However,
the size of download lists might be multiple gigabytes if
there are millions of participants. The partial download
method saves user resources at the cost of some privacy in
case of a compromised signer; however, revealing only a
small part of the nonce (e.g., 1 byte of a 16 byte nonce),
each user still retains a significant anonymity set. Fi-
nally, the individual download method loses more privacy
in case of a compromised signer, but the specific amount
of privacy loss depends on the mechanism by which the
values are downloaded (for example, when downloading
over Tor [9], the privacy properties are the same as Tor’s).
6 Security Analysis
Mitigate DoS attacks. BlindSignedIDs mitigate the
DoS attacks by ensuring that each EphID stored by a
user is an EphID generated for a valid user. BlindSignedID
provides an in-place verification to mitigate the DoS at-
tacks on the local storage in that the user will reject an
arbitrarily generated EphID that is not associated with a
real identity.
7 Evaluations
7.1 BlindSignedID on DoS attacks
Single attacker. In this section, we evaluated
BlindSignedID via sending BLE beacons using mobile de-
vices. Figure 4 shows our experimental setup. We imple-
mented a release key UDP server as the TESLA server,
and each key was released every 5 mins. Moreover, we
built an Android application to advertise BlindSignedID
and scan BLE beacons on two victim’s phones placed at
a distance of around 20 cm. For the single attacker, we
generated a set of 70,000 random EphIDs sent by a single
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B with the distance 1.5 m. We
used the first 13-byte of HMAC-SHA1 as authenticator.
6
TESLA Server
Figure 4: DoS attacks Experimental Setup.
Figure 5: Stored EphIDs Sent by Single Attacker.
Each random BLE beacon was broadcasted and the ro-
tating time was 20 ms. The receiver stored each EphID
with the time of first receipt, duration, RSSI and authen-
ticator temporarily. Whenever a key release is scheduled,
the receiver fetches the key over UDP, checks the key,
and for each record, attempts to verify the record. When
a record is verified, the receiver puts the time of first
receipt, duration of contact, and RSSI in local storage,
consuming 38 bytes per EphID . Figure 5 shows our re-
sults. Our BlindSignedID rejected all DoS attacks pe-
riodically created by the attacking set, and prevented
nearly 30,000 fake EphIDs stored in 30 mins. Conse-
quently, the original EphID designs are vulnerable to
DoS attacks, and BlindSignedID can mitigate such at-
tacks in-place. In an actual attack, the attacker can fur-
ther modify BlueZ stack to transmit BLE beacons as fre-
quently as possible, so DoS attacks are even more severe
under such circumstances.
Multiple attackers. In addition, we evaluated
BlindSignedID with multiple attackers to somewhat miti-
gate the long interval between attacker EphIDs. We gen-
(a) 2 Attackers.
(b) 4 Attackers.
Figure 6: Stored EphIDs Sent by Multiple Attackers.
erated 4 sets of 4,320,000 random EphIDs, which were
used by 2 and 4 Raspberry Pis. Figure 6 shows that 2
and 4 attackers using off-the-shelf BlueZ broadcast in-
tervals can cause approximately 1,227,000 and 1,891,000
stored EphIDs within 8 hrs, representing 645 MBytes and
1.076 GBytes across 14 8-hour days, respectively. Due to
networking and processing delays, receivers do not filter
all of the invalid EphIDs every 5 minutes, but the sys-
tem still trends towards significant reductions in storage
requirements.
Crowded environment. We performed 3 experiments
where over 14 people were originized in grid positions
with a distance of 0.5 m, 1 m, and 1.5 m in a middle-
size room, respectively. (These experiments were con-
ducted in compliance with local social distancing require-
ments.) We used 6 Raspberry Pis as the attackers to
send random EphIDs near the same power outlet. Each
scenario was conducted for 1–2 mins. Table 1 reported
the numbers of received EphIDs and real EphIDs verified
by BlindSignedID. As distance increases, devices receive
fewer EphIDs due to signal strength losses over longer dis-
tances. Also, our BlindSignedID continues to effectively
reduce storage consumption, removing over 90% of the
identities produced by DoS attacks.
8 Related Works
This section reviews several papers that inspire
BlindSignedID.
Digital Contact Tracing. BlindSignedID mostly fol-
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Scenario Distance Original EphIDs BlindSignedID Reduced Rate
0.5 m 12,122 181 96.72%
1.0 m 6,526 76 97.87%
1.5 m 2,098 28 93.59%
Table 1: DoS attacks on crowded indoor environment.
lows the current design of DP-3T [34], where a secret
day seed is used to generate a set of ephemeral identi-
fiers. Most current projects follow the similar designs.
However, current designs suffer from DoS attacks. Al-
though BlindSignedID is based on DP-3T, it can be ap-
plied to a wide range of projects based on ephemeral IDs,
such as [4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, 34]. Moreover, the user reg-
istration of BlueTrace [13] utilizes the phone number to
acquire a unique, randomised user ID from the backend
server. Like BlueTrace, BlindSignedID requires the real
IDs (e.g., phone numbers), but the BlueTrace server can
learn which particular phone number is linked to which
user ID. In other words, the signer can violate the user’s
privacy; in BlindSignedID, by contrast, the signer learns
no information that can associate an ephemeral identifier
with a real ID, other than the day on which the EphID
was signed and the set of real IDs that authenticated on
that day. The ROBERT protocol [16], a framework re-
lated to PEPP-PT [7], suggests that the proof-of-work
system can be used during application registration to pre-
vent from automatic registrations, but it does not solve
the DoS attacks in-place on local storage, and the wide
range of computation power available to different devices
makes it difficult to simultaneously allow older mobile
phone users to create identities while also preventing well-
resourced attackers from creating thousands of identities.
Replay and Relay Attacks. [32, 35] seek to prevent
replay and relay attacks on DP-3T. Such attacks can
be performed by broadcasting ephemeral IDs generated
by published secret seeds. Since these published seeds
are positive cases, other users receive false alerts due to
such attacks. [35] propose an interactive protocol to pre-
vent such attacks, but it might not be efficient for digital
contact tracing. [32] further present Delayed Authentica-
tion, which is a non-interactive method to prevent (long-
term) replay and relay attacks. They tie a BLE broadcast
beacon to time and location information through a key.
The receiver verifies potential positives with the back-
end server. BlueTrace [13] utilizes encrypted User IDs
with timestamps as TempID for beaconing, thus mitigat-
ing long-term replay attacks (but not relay attacks) by
validating the timestamps of each TempID after the user
uploads all records. In summary, these proposals prevent
long-term replay attacks and potentially relay attacks by
including time information and keys in BLE beacons.
However, the current digital contact tracing systems still
suffer from DoS attacks.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we present BlindSignedIDs, which can miti-
gate DoS attacks on the current digital contact tracing
designs. In particular, we propose BlindSignedIDs that
are verifiable without compromising the user’s privacy to
mitigate DoS attacks. Anonymous identifiers do cause
the mass surveillance difficult to be conducted. However,
using anonymous identifiers without verifications intro-
duces security issues in the current designs. Finally, we
evaluated our BlindSignedIDs with example DoS attacks
and showd BlindSignedIDs can reduce DoS attacks.
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